Crews seldom train for take-off performance errors: inquiry
Dutch investigators probing a serious Boeing 737-800 take-off incident at Groningen have noted that pilots are seldom exposed to performance-related events during simulator training. The Dutch Safety Board found that the first officer had miscalculated the take-off weight, introducing a 10t error, which resulted in the Transavia aircraft's only becoming airborne 60m from the end of the runway. It describes the incident as "critical", pointing out that – even before the calculated V1 decision speed – the captain had realised that the take-off could not be safely aborted with the remaining runway length. Boeing subsequently calculated that the calculated V1 threshold was 15kt higher than the safe 122kt abort speed. But the inquiry into the September 2014 incident determined that, despite observing the slow acceleration, neither pilot took corrective action to increase the engine thrust. Analysis of similar performance-related take-off incidents reveals that no additional thrust was selected in the majority of cases, the inquiry states, and that early rotation is only occasionally initiated. Pilots regularly undergo simulator training to handle time-critical events such as engine failure during take-off. But the inquiry claims: "Performance-related incidents are not trained in the simulator and the accompanying cues are less obvious.<br/>
https://portal.staralliance.com/cms/news/hot-topics/2018-03-16/general/crews-seldom-train-for-take-off-performance-errors-inquiry
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Crews seldom train for take-off performance errors: inquiry
Dutch investigators probing a serious Boeing 737-800 take-off incident at Groningen have noted that pilots are seldom exposed to performance-related events during simulator training. The Dutch Safety Board found that the first officer had miscalculated the take-off weight, introducing a 10t error, which resulted in the Transavia aircraft's only becoming airborne 60m from the end of the runway. It describes the incident as "critical", pointing out that – even before the calculated V1 decision speed – the captain had realised that the take-off could not be safely aborted with the remaining runway length. Boeing subsequently calculated that the calculated V1 threshold was 15kt higher than the safe 122kt abort speed. But the inquiry into the September 2014 incident determined that, despite observing the slow acceleration, neither pilot took corrective action to increase the engine thrust. Analysis of similar performance-related take-off incidents reveals that no additional thrust was selected in the majority of cases, the inquiry states, and that early rotation is only occasionally initiated. Pilots regularly undergo simulator training to handle time-critical events such as engine failure during take-off. But the inquiry claims: "Performance-related incidents are not trained in the simulator and the accompanying cues are less obvious.<br/>